Freitag, 4.Oktober 2019, 10:00 - 18:00 Uhr
Universität Wien, Oskar-Morgensternplatz 1, 9.Stock, 1090 Wien
https://homepage.univie.ac.at/josef.hofbauer/w19okt4.htm
Programm: pdf
Christoph Kuzmics (joint with Daniel Rodenburger)
"A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory"
We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe et al. (Soc Choice Welf 10:223–247, 1993). In every one of 24 rounds, 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14-player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.